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Driving southwest from Powell, Wyoming, with the kernelshaped summit of Heart Mountain above you and the geysers of
Yellowstone ahead, you would not know that you were passing the
site of a concentration camp.' The rugged beauty of the place is so
arresting that it is easy to miss a small metal plaque by the side of
the road:
HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION CENTER
1942-1945
During the World War II years, Heart Mountain Relocation
Center was located on a 740-acre tract of land across the Burlington Railroad right-of-way westward from where you stand
facing this monument and Heart Mountain itself....
Eleven thousand people of Japanese ancestry from the three
west-coast states were loosely confined by the United States
government in the Center for about three years. They lived in
barracks as singles, or as families, according to their marital
status.
The camp was equipped with modern waterworks and sewer
system and a modern hospital and dental clinic staffed with
people from the ranks of the evacuees. First rate schooling was

t Associate Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. I dedicate this essay

to the Nisei draft resisters who have reached out a hand of friendship across the years that
separate us to help me learn their important story: Gene Akutsu, Frank Emi, Kazuo Hiromoto,
Tak Hoshizaki, Mits Koshiyama, Yosh Kuromiya, Jack Tono, Jimi Yamaichi, Frank Yamasaki,
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' I use the term "concentration camp" to describe the World War II internment centers
built to house the ethnically Japanese because that is what they were called at the time. See,
for example, Ted Nakashima, ConcentrationCamp: U.S. Style, New Republic 822 (June 15,
1942). I also use the term because it is descriptively accurate: these were places where people
considered dangerous to the state were "concentrated" for total control. I do not mean to compare the American camps to the Nazi death camps in Europe.
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provided for the children of the evacuees through the high
school grades.
This monument was erected, 1969, by the American Legion
Posts of Heart Mountain and Powell, Wyoming, and their auxiliaries, in the interest of international peace and understanding, and as a memorial to the men and women who have died
in the service of our country.2
What the plaque says is true, in a very limited sense. About
eleven thousand people of Japanese descent-some seven thousand
of them U.S. citizens--did spend up to three years at the Heart
Mountain Relocation Center ("Heart Mountain") during the war.
They did have toilets and running water, medical care, and schools.
But the plaque also omits much that is true. "Loose confinement" meant imprisonment behind barbed wire, with search lights
and U.S. Army guards authorized to arrest or even shoot anyone
leaving without a pass. The camp's barracks were long chains of unfurnished single rooms with common open ceilings that carried unwelcome noises, odors, and rumors from family to family. The barracks offered only slatted wood and tar paper against the raw Wyoming winter. Residents had to brave dust, heat, snow, and wind to
enjoy the benefits of the camp's "modern waterworks and sewer system," which often froze during the wintertime. The "modern hospital
and dental clinic" was the site of two employee walkouts over inadequate pay, substandard working conditions, and disrespect from the
camp's Caucasian administrators.3 The "first rate schooling," which
did not exist at all for the first several months of the internees' time
at Heart Mountain, never fully overcame its struggles with high faculty turnover, high student absenteeism, inadequate heating, and
insufficient supplies.4
Which was the real Heart Mountain: the one that the sign describes, or the one that it conceals? It was probably both of these,
and more-a harsh and degrading penitentiary from the perspective
of many, an unwelcome but tolerable change of scenery for others,
perhaps a safe haven from the pressures of war for a few. In short,

Historical Marker on Wyo Hwy 14A at Mile 13 (photocopy on file with U Chi L Rev).
See Louis Fiset, The HeartMountain HospitalStrike of June 24, 1943, in Mike Mackey,
ed, RememberingHeart Mountain 101 (Western History Publications 1998).
See Mamoru Inouye, HeartMountain High School, 1942-1945,in Mackey, ed, RememberingHeartMountain 75, 80-82 (cited in note 3); Lane Ryo Hirabayashi, The Impact oflncarceration on the Education of Nisei Schoolchildren, in Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor and
Harry H.L. Kitano, eds, JapaneseAmericans: From Relocation to Redress 44, 44-45 (Utah
1986).
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there are many stories of Heart Mountain. But only one of them
made it onto the American Legion's roadside plaque.
The story on the marker ultimately says more about the organization that placed it than the place it describes. In this way, the
plaque neatly illustrates one of the dangers of writing history. In
telling a story, the historian must sift the important from the unimportant, the typical from the atypical, and the interesting from the
uninteresting. It is often not just the tale but the viewpoint of the
person telling it that shakes out in the sifting.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist recently published an engaging volume of legal history entitled All the Laws but One. His
topic is the history of civil liberties during wartime, which calls upon
him to address, among other things, the World War II internment
of Japanese-Americans at places like Heart Mountain. The Chief
Justice is unquestionably a good storyteller, and certainly a more
balanced one than the writer of the legend on the roadside plaque at
Heart Mountain. Yet his viewpoint shines through. It is instantly
recognizable to any student of Rehnquist's judicial philosophy-majoritarian, deferential to claims of social order, and unimaginative
in its conception of individual liberty.' War, Rehnquist argues, is
hell-not just for soldiers on the battlefield, but for civil liberties at
home. It has been so in every declared war in this nation's history,
he says, and it will undoubtedly always be so.
Perhaps. The stories that Rehnquist tells certainly do make
wartime seem an invariably harrowing time for claims of personal
freedom. But as with the plaque at Heart Mountain, the Chief Justice does not tell all of the stories of civil liberty in wartime. Moreover, some of the stories he neglects come from the Civil War and
from the Japanese-American internment-the very periods and
events that the Chief Justice examines. These stories may not impeach his ultimate conclusion that presidents and judges are least
motivated to view civil rights broadly during periods of national
military crisis. But they do reveal a rival tradition to the one he describes. A complete history of civil liberties during wartime ought to
take this rival tradition into account.
I.
"[T]he Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime
President."" So wrote former Attorney General Francis Biddle in
' See Robert E. Riggs and Thomas D. Proffitt, The Judicial Philosophy of Justice
Rehnquist, 16 Akron L Rev 555, 597-99 (1983) (concluding that Rehnquist reads the Constitution narrowly to avoid derogating the principle of majority rule); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist.A PreliminaryView, 90 Harv L Rev 293, 294 (1976).
Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 219 (Doubleday 1962).
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1962, reflecting on the ease with which his former boss, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, signed the executive order evacuating
more than one hundred thousand ethnically Japanese people from
the west coast after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Alone
among Roosevelt's top men, Biddle opposed the evacuation. Roosevelt, on the other hand, did not seem "much concerned with the
gravity or implications of this step."7 The "constitutional difficulty"
of the evacuation simply did not "plague[ ] him."8
For Chief Justice Rehnquist, Biddle's conclusion that presidents
do not lose sleep over the Constitution during wartime is "a remarkably perceptive observation" (p 191). Rehnquist pairs this observation about presidents with one of his own about judges: they
are "reluctan[t] ... to decide a case against the government on an

issue of national security during a war" (p 221). By the end ofAll the
Laws but One, these two observations mature into something much
closer to prescriptions. The nation, Rehnquist concludes, is ultimately more secure when wartime presidents worry about war
rather than law and judges accede by avoiding or narrowing their
readings of the Bill of Rights until the crisis is over.
The stories that lead the Chief Justice to this conclusion are
fascinating, colorful, and generally well told. His book begins with
the Civil War, and his first tale is that of newly elected President
Abraham Lincoln's suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus. Lincoln
emerges from these early chapters as an isolated figure in a vulnerable federal enclave sandwiched between the open rebellion of Virginia to the south and the simmering hostility of Maryland to the
north. Efforts to reinforce the capital ran into trouble in Baltimore:
a group of Union recruits was trapped by angry anti-Union mobs as
the soldiers made a cross-town connection from one.train station to
another; the ensuing riots left four Union soldiers and twelve civilians dead (pp 20-21). After these riots, the governor of Maryland ordered the railroad bridges north of Baltimore burned in order to prevent more federal troops from reaching the capital (p 21). Lincoln
responded to this challenge on April 27, 1861-just seven weeks into
his first term in office-by authorizing the commanding general of
the U.S. Army to suspend the writ of habeas corpus wherever "necessary..., for the public safety" along any military line between
Philadelphia and Washington (p 25).
The suspension of the writ would soon expand. In October of
1861, it was enlarged to include any place between Bangor, Maine
and Washington (p 48). In August of 1862, the suspension became
Id.
8

Id.
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nationwide (p 60). More frightening developments followed. In September of 1862, Lincoln proclaimed that any person obstructing
military enlistment or "guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid
and comfort to rebels" would be subject to "martial law and liable to
trial and punishment by courts-martial or military commissions" (p
60). Thus, not only were suspects unable to seek review in civil court
through habeas corpus, but they were subject to trial by military
procedure for offenses unknown to the civil law. Alongside the civilian justice system now stood an extra-constitutional system of freewheeling military "justice" of Abraham Lincoln's creation.
The lawfulness of this system would be tested in court. Shortly
after the first suspension of habeas corpus along the north-south rail
lines, a Maryland resident named John Merryman was arrested and
detained by Union troops for helping to destroy the railroad bridges.
His attorney quickly applied for a writ of habeas corpus from Chief
Justice Roger Taney, but federal military officials refused to comply
with Taney's order to produce the prisoner. Taney responded by filing an opinion declaring Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus unconstitutional and holding that military officials lacked power to
subject civilians to military arrest or trial. Rehnquist notes that Lincoln ignored Taney's order and refused to release Merryman (p 38).
Surely, Lincoln would later argue, a wartime president cannot follow
Taney's advice and allow "all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted,
and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated" (p
38).
A better known defendant, former Ohio congressman Clement
Vallandigham, met a similar fate. Military authorities arrested him
in the middle of the night of May 5, 1863, for violating a military
order forbidding the "declar[ation of] sympathies with the enemy"
(p 64). His offense was a speech criticizing that very order and urging the unseating of "King Lincoln" (pp 65-66). The next day he was
tried and convicted by a military commission and sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war (p 67). Lincoln ultimately
changed the sentence to banishment to the Confederacy. But Lincoln
defended the government's treatment of Vallandigham-ably, in
Rehnquist's estimation-by asking, simply, 'Must I shoot a simpleminded soldier boy who deserts while I must not touch a hair on the
head of a wily agitator who induces him to desert" (p 73)?'
The last and best known of the judicial challenges to the Union's use of martial law against civilians was the military trial that

For a complete and insightful telling of the Vallandigham story, see Michael Kent
Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, andAnti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7 Wm & Mary Bill of

Rts J 105 (1998).

1400

The University of Chicago Law Review

[66:1395

produced the Supreme Court's 1866 decision in Ex ParteMilligan.'
This set of events captures Rehnquist's attention most, as he devotes
more than one quarter of his book to the Milligan tale (pp 75-137).
In some respects, Lambdin Milligan's story resembled Clement
Vallandigham's. Milligan, a well known lawyer and political figure,
was one of seven Indiana men who were arrested by military
authorities in September of 1864 and charged with military (rather
than civilian) offenses. The allegations had the conspirators planning a violent uprising that would free eight thousand Confederate
prisoners of war in Union jails, seize Union munitions, abduct and
depose the Republican governor of Indiana, and disrupt the 1864
Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Rehnquist notes that
the stakes in Milligan were high-much higher than they would
have been had the federal government proceeded against these (civilian) conspirators in civilian courts. Not only were the military
charges much broader than existing federal statutes would have
permitted, but the punishment authorized in the military setting
was death rather than the six to ten year terms of imprisonment
available under federal statutes (pp 86-88).
Rehnquist reviews the evidence that military prosecutors offered against Milligan and his codefendants, and concludes that the
military had a strong case against only one of Milligan's codefendants (pp 90-101)." Yet the tribunal convicted all of the defendants
on almost all of the charges and sentenced three of them-including
Milligan-to death (p 102). Reviewing the cases after Lincoln's assassination, Andrew Johnson commuted the death sentences to life
at hard labor (p 104). But Milligan and his colleagues pressed on in
their defense, filing habeas petitions contesting the lawfulness of
their trial and imprisonment by military authority.
The task of determining the constitutionality of military trials
for civilians thus fell to the Supreme Court-specifically, to Abraham Lincoln's old confidant and colleague from their Illinois circuitriding days, Justice David Davis. 2 The majority opinion in Milligan
resoundingly rejected the government's defense of Lincoln's wartime
regime of military justice for civilians. Not surprisingly, four of the
five votes for this position came from justices appointed by Democrats. But the fifth vote-and the majority opinion itself-came from
71 US (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
"The codefendant against whom the case was strongest fled to Canada before trial (pp 83-

84).
" After managing Lincoln's successful bid for the Presidency in 1860, Davis returned to

his Illinois law practice until Lincoln appointed him to the Supreme Court in August of 1862.
Davis was Lincoln's third Supreme Court appointment; by the time of the Milligan decision
in 1866, two more Lincoln appointees would join those three and the four Justices appointed
by Lincoln's Democratic predecessors.
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none other than David Davis. Davis wrote that the government violated a number of constitutional provisions in trying and convicting
Milligan and his alleged coconspirators before a military tribunal.
First, it violated Article III by permitting judges without life tenure
to exercise judicial power in a court not created by Congress. Second,
it violated Milligan's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Third,
it exceeded whatever power it had to suspend the writ of habeas corpus by trying Milligan on military charges at a time when the civil
courts were open. In sweeping language, Davis held that martial law
could only be imposed and applied against civilians when an actual
invasion or insurrection "effectually closes the courts and deposes
the civil administration.""3 "No doctrine," he wrote, "involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than
that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government."14
Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly disapproves of Milligan. The
decision, he argues, was recklessly broad, reaching out to decide an
important constitutional question about the scope of congressional
power that the case did not present (p 134). Although Congress had
not attempted to pass a law providing for military trials of civilians
while the civil courts were open, Davis so broadly condemned martial law that his opinion seemed to forbid Congress from ever trying
to do so.' 5
Picking up his pace noticeably, Rehnquist next moves to World
War I (pp 170-83). He focuses on the passage of the Espionage Act
in June of 1917, a law that broadly criminalized statements tending
to hinder the war effort or the draft and that gave Postmaster General Albert Burleson the authority to close the mails to publications
or correspondence urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance
to any law of the United States (p 173). It was, of course, prosecutions under the Espionage Act, and the short-lived amendments to
it known as the Sedition Act, that prompted Judge Learned Hand
and Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Dembitz Brandeis to
begin experimenting with a First Amendment theory that would
71 US (4 Wall) at 127.
Id at 121.
This precedent, Rehnquist notes, became a problem eighty years later when military
authorities captured and tried a group of German soldiers who had landed in Long Island and
Florida with the intention of destroying war industries in the United States (pp 136-37). See
United States v Quirin,317 US 1, 45-46 (1942) (distinguishing MUlligan by noting that, unlike
the defendants in the present case, Milligan was not an enemy belligerent). President Roosevelt ordered that the defendants be tried by a military commission. Naturally, their lawyers
relied on Milligan'sexpansive pronouncements in contesting the proceedings, and the Court
had to do some fancy footwork in order to distinguish Milligan and uphold their death sen'3
"

tences.
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protect subversive speakers. Rehnquist briefly describes these
prosecutions, noting that Hand, Holmes, and Brandeis were unsuccessful in their efforts to galvanize judicial resistance to the speech
suppression of the political branches (pp 174-82).
Rehnquist notes some important differences between the government's rights-denying strategies during the Civil War and World
War I (pp 182-83). Chief among these differences was the involvement of Congress. Whereas the suppression of individual rights was
entirely an executive branch affair during the Civil War, Congress
took the lead during World War I, giving the executive broad powers
to punish and silence subversive speakers. Rehnquist observes that
the period saw no trials of civilians before military courts and increased involvement of the civil courts in the adjudication of individual rights claims (p 183). Still, the bottom line for civil liberties
was bleak. Rehnquist concludes that "[t]he Wilson administration,
during the First World War, proved to have the same instinctive desire to suppress harsh criticism of the war effort as had the Lincoln
administration during the Civil War" (p 182).
By the time of World War II, Rehnquist is able to report a "generally ameliorative trend" in government protection of individual
liberties during wartime (p 221). "IThere was no overt effort by the
government to suppress public criticism of government war policy,"
he reports, partly because World War II was a more popular war
than was World War I, but also partly because "the First Amendment had come into its own" (p 22 1).
There was, however, one big blemish on the government's civil
liberties record during the Second World War: the forced evacuation
from the west coast of about 110,000 people of Japanese descent.
Rehnquist devotes two full chapters of his book to this story. 6 According to Rehnquist, the government decided to evacuate and intern the Japanese and Japanese-Americans living on the west coast
for essentially military reasons (pp 187-88). West coast communities
were in a panic after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, fearing direct
attacks on their cities or even a full-scale invasion by Japan. Fanning these fears, from December 1941 through the late spring of
1942, the war in the Pacific went horribly for the United States and
its allies. Island nations around the Pacific Rim fell to Japanese control like so many dominoes; two of the Aleutian Islands came under
assault and were briefly occupied. And in February of 1942, a Japanese submarine shelled an oil installation near Santa Barbara. In
this climate, Rehnquist reports, west coast "[r]esidents became fear, Somewhat confusingly, Rehnquist refers to the evacuation in the plural, as the "Japanese internments" (p 184).
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ful of the ethnic Japanese among them," and their local, state, and
federal representatives began demanding evacuation (p 188).
Rehnquist notes in passing that there were "nativists" in California who "disliked [the ethnic Japanese] and wished to remove
them as neighbors or as business competitors" (p 206). Indeed, in the
three or four decades that the Japanese immigrants (the "Issei") and
their American-born children (the "Nisei") had been in this country,
many had become so successful in farming that they had aroused
deep economic resentment in their more established Caucasian
competitors." Rehnquist, however, downplays the impact of racial
hatred and economic jealousy on the relocation decision. He pointedly refuses to attribute the base motives of some segments of the
civilian population to the west coast military leaders, arguing that
military leaders "did not at first propose relocation." Rather, according to Rehnquist, "those of Japanese descent were displaced because of fear that disloyal elements among them would aid Japan in
the war" (p 206)."8
The actual decision to evacuate was quick. On February 11,
1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson tried to get an appointment with President Roosevelt to ask him if he would be willing to
authorize the removal of both the Issei and the Nisei (collectively the
"Nikkei") from the west coast. Roosevelt was too busy for anything
but a telephone call, but he enthusiastically told Stimson to "go
ahead on the line that [Stimson him]self thought the best" (pp 19091). Eight days later, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which
authorized General John DeWitt, commanding officer of the Western
Defense Command, 9 to remove all ethnic Japanese from any military zone under his command (p 192). Congress promptly passed
laws making it a crime to violate any regulation that DeWitt might
impose to implement Roosevelt's order.2 °

" Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians ("Commission on Wartime Relocation"), PersonalJusticeDenied 42-43, 69-70 (Civil Liberties Public Education Fund
1997).
S Here Chief Justice Rehnquist parts company with the federal Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians, an agency created by Congress in 1980 to investigate
the Japanese-American internment and make recommendations on a possible redress effort.
The Commission made clear in its final report to Congress that "[tihe War Department and
the President, through the press and politicians with the aid of general DeWitt, [were] sold a
bill
of goods" by supporters of evacuation who managed to dress up their economic envies and
ethnic hatreds in the garb of military necessity. Id at 91. See also id at 6-8. Chief Justice
Rehnquist cites the Commission's report in his bibliography (p 238) but was evidently unimpressed by its conclusions.
"9The Western Defense Command included the states of Washington, Oregon, California,
and Arizona (p 188).
2 Pub L No 77-503, 56 Stat 173 (1942).
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The evacuation was promptly underway. The Nikkei of California, Washington, and Oregon were first placed under curfew. Then
they were moved to so-called "assembly centers," primarily fairgrounds and racetracks, where they spent the summer of 1942. In
the early fall, the government began moving them to camps that had
been hurriedly set up (or were still under construction) in the California interior and in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and
Wyoming. Rehnquist's description of the internment experience itself is brief: "There was no physical brutality, but there were certainly severe hardships-physical removal from the place where one
lived, often forced sale of houses and businesses, and harsh living
conditions in the spartan quarters of the internment centers" (p
192). He also notes that "[a]s the war progressed, some restrictions
were relaxed" (p 192). Some Nisei volunteered into the U.S. Army
and fought in Europe; other internees applied for and received permission to relocate to the eastern and midwestern United States.
Rehnquist reports that all remaining internees were released by the
beginning of 1945-three years after their evacuation-when the
Supreme Court held that the continued detention of loyal citizens
against their will exceeded
the scope of Executive Order 9066 and its
21
implementing statutes.
Not surprisingly, it is the Supreme Court's response to the
Japanese-American internment that most attracts Rehnquist's attention. He describes in detail the three cases in which the Supreme
Court dealt with challenges to the legality of the government's actions (pp 192-202). The first of these cases, United States v Hirabayashi, 2 was a challenge to both the curfew and the subsequent relocation. The case came to the Court in the late spring of 1943, when
the war in the Pacific was still far from won. The Court declined to
reach Hirabayashi's claim that the relocation was unconstitutional,
but it upheld the curfew by an 8-0 vote (p 198). A year later the
Court heard Korematsu v United States2 3 and Ex ParteEndo,2 4 both
of which attacked the legality of the relocation. The results were
mixed. In Korematsu, the Court, although much more divided than
it had been in Hirabayashi,upheld the relocation against constitutional attack. But the Court agreed with Mitsuye Endo that she was
entitled to be released from confinement at the Topaz Relocation
Center in Utah: the government stipulated that she was a loyal citizen, and neither Executive Order 9066 nor its implementing stat-

Ex ParteEndo, 323 US 283, 300-02 (1944).
320 US 81 (1943).
323 US 214 (1944).
323 US 283 (1944).
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utes in any way authorized the incarceration of the loyal (pp 20002).
Rehnquist acknowledges that modern opinion is highly critical
both of the internment and of the Court's response to it (pp 203-11).
His own view is that "some of th[e] criticism is well justified, and
some not" (p 203). He rejects outright the broad criticism that the
entire evacuation and relocation program was born of racist suspicion and economic jealousy. To this claim, he says simply, "The
Court's answer.., seems satisfactory-those of Japanese descent
were displaced because of fear that disloyal elements among them
would aid Japan in the war" (p 206).
Rehnquist is troubled, however, by the narrower objection that
the Nisei were treated differently from other American citizens (pp
206-09). He is persuaded that the government presented enough
evidence of a risk of subversion by disloyal Nisei to justify limited
restrictions on them, but in his estimation the evidence was not sufficient to justify the wholesale exclusion of the Nisei from the west
coast. Even here, however, Rehnquist defends the Korematsu Court's
rejection of the very claim that troubles him. He points out that Korematsu came ten years before the Supreme Court discovered an
unwritten equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment25 (p 208). "Had this doctrine been the law ten
years earlier," Rehnquist offers, "the Supreme Court might have
found it easier to reach a different result in Hirabayashiand Korematsu" (p 208).
What does not trouble Rehnquist, however, is the evacuation
and internment of the Issei-the generation of Japanese immigrants
who had come to this country around the turn of the century and
who had been forbidden by law from becoming American citizens.
The Issei "were both by tradition and by law in a quite different
category" from their citizen children, the Nisei (p 209). "Distinctions
that might not be permissible between classes of citizens must be
viewed otherwise when drawn between classes of aliens" (p 210).
Because of the genuine fears of Japanese attack and invasion of the
west coast, and because the Issei were so concentrated in that area,
Rehnquist argues the government was justified in removing them.
There was, of course, one place in the United States where the
concentration of Nikkei was even greater than in western California,
Oregon, and Washington. That place was Hawaii, then a territory
of the United States, containing perhaps the most strategically significant American military installation in the entire Pacific theater,

See Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 500 (1954) (invalidating federal statute segregating
District of Columbia schools).
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the naval base at Pearl Harbor. Rehnquist fails to note the irony
that the Nikkei of Hawaii were never evacuated from the island and
never interned en masse. He does, however, devote a brief chapter
to the imposition of martial law in Hawaii during the war (pp 21217). Within a few hours of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the
territorial governor signed an order placing the territory under martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus. He also asked the
commanding general of the Military Department of Hawaii to exercise all governing power-executive, legislative, and judicial. The
general agreed, and Hawaii functioned under martial law for the
next three years.
During these years, tensions flared between military and civilian authority over the writ of habeas corpus. In the best known of
the conflicts, military authorities arrested and tried two civilians for
a 1942 embezzlement and a 1944 assault that had nothing whatsoever to do with the military. A federal district judge granted their
habeas corpus petitions, concluding that there was no military necessity for military trials of civilians for nonmilitary offenses. The
government appealed, but it did not get the broad authorization of
2 6 decided afmartial law it was seeking. In Duncan v Kahanamoku,
ter the end of World War II, the Supreme Court held that Congress
intended to permit martial law only as militarily necessary. The
Court saw no military necessity to try a common brawler and a garden variety embezzler before military tribunals. This ruling, says
Rehnquist, was unquestionably correct: Hirabayashiand Korematsu
(both of which were highly deferential to military and executive
judgments constraining civil liberty) were not controlling because
the Court decided them during wartime, when judicial authority to
countermand the orders of military officials is at its nadir (p 217).
That is the last of Chief Justice Rehnquist's tales of civil liberties during wartime. The Korean Conflict and, most importantly, the
war in Vietnam go unexamined. Rehnquist is clear about his reasons for limiting his analysis to the Civil War, World War I, and
World War II: those were the nation's declared wars (or their
equivalent, in the case of the Civil War). "Without question,"
Rehnquist asserts, "the government's authority to engage in conduct
that infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared war" (p
218). Rehnquist does not seem especially troubled by this conclusion.
That, for him, is just the way things are: "[T]here is some truth to
the maxim Inter arma silent leges, at least in the purely descriptive
sense"2" (p 221). But there is also truth to the maxim for Rehnquist

327 US 304 (1946).
The phrase means "when arms speak, the laws are silent."
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in the prescriptive sense. Abraham Lincoln was rightto suspend the
writ of habeas corpus along the north-south rail line in 1861 without
"weigh[ing] the pros and cons as to whether he was authorized by
the Constitution to do this before acting" (p 223).
But what of the courts? It is their special duty to see to it that
the political branches do not exceed the confines of the Constitution
and intrude on individual liberty. Yet time and again Rehnquist sees
the courts sitting on the sidelines while the war rages, "reluctan[t]
to decide a case against the government on an issue of national security during a war" (p 221). "Is this reluctance a necessary evil,"
Rehnquist asks, "or is it actually a desirable phenomenon" (p 221)?
For Rehnquist, it is desirable for two reasons. First, he argues,
whether we like it or not, courts do hesitate to decide cases against
the government during wartime. "If, in fact, courts are more prone
to uphold wartime claims of civil liberties after the war is over, may
it not actually be desirable to avoid decision on such claims during
the war" (p 222)? Second, and far more importantly, the scope of our
civil liberties contracts during wartime. This is the most striking
claim in the entire book. Rehnquist reminds us that "[i]t is not simply 'liberty' but civil liberty of which we speak" (p 222). The word
"civil" derives from the Latin word for "citizen"-"a person owing
allegiance to some organized government, and not a person in an
idealized 'state of nature' free from any governmental restraint" (p
222). Civil liberty, properly understood, is a delicate point of balance
between an individual's interest in freedom and the government's
interest in order. "In wartime," Rehnquist concludes, "reason and
history both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor
of order-in favor of the government's ability to deal with conditions
that threaten the national well-being" (p 222).
To be sure, the Chief Justice assures the reader of his hope and
expectation that courts will continue to pay more careful attention
to "the basis for the government's claims of necessity as a basis for
curtailing civil liberty" (p 225), saying that such scrutiny is both "desirable and likely" (p 225). But it is not clear from Rehnquist's account why this is the case. Debating the desirability of court supervision is, for Rehnquist, "very largely academic" (p 224). He simply
sees "no reason to think that future wartime presidents will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt, or that future Justices
of the Supreme Court will decide questions differently from their
predecessors" (p 224).
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II.
A. A Book More About Order than Liberty
The subtitle to All the Laws but One, "Civil Liberties in Wartime," promises a tale about freedoms-frail and beleaguered freedoms, perhaps, but freedoms. That is not what the book delivers.
Chief Justice Rehnquist is not especially interested in freedoms, at
least where those are understood as rights enjoyed by individuals
"free from any governmental restraint" (p 222). He quotes Learned
Hand approvingly: "A society in which men recognize no check upon
their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few" (p 222).28 Individual liberties seem to capture the Chief Justice's attention only in relation to, and through the
lens of, the government's countervailing claims for social order.
The result is a book in which claims for order, and the government officials asserting and adjudicating them, become the protagonists. In the book's two hundred twenty-five pages, there is exactly
one sentence that even attempts to describe what the experience of
losing one's freedoms during wartime might be like. It is a sentence
summing up the experience of Japanese-American internees: "There
was no physical brutality, but there were certainly severe hardships-physical removal from the place where one lived, often forced
sale of houses and businesses, and harsh living conditions in the
spartan quarters of the internment centers" (p 192).
That single sentence reveals its author's perspective on the
events and his bias towards order. It is hardly the case that "no
physical brutality" was ever directed against internees. No physical
brutality was needed to force the west coast Nikkei from their
homes, but only because the evacuees were remarkably compliant
with General DeWitt's evacuation order. Once the evacuees settled
in for indefinite incarceration in desolate camps the situation
changed. In the wake of riots late in 1943, internees in the Tule
Lake Relocation Center in northeastern California saw weeks of
frightening physical brutality; internees were beaten, kicked,
dragged from place to place, and had tear gas fired at them. 9 Riots
at Manzanar Relocation Center resulted in the shootings of at least
a dozen Nisei,3" and on another occasion, an army guard shot and
injured a Nisei who wandered outside Manzanar's boundaries in

Quoting Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in Irving Dilliard, ed, The Spirit of Liberty
189, 190 (Knopf 1953).
See Commission on Wartime Relocation, PersonalJusticeDeniedat 210-11 (cited in note

17).

, See Page Smith, Democracy on Trial 262-64 (Simon & Schuster 1995).
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search of scrap wood to make shelves for his barracks."1 Many Issei
who were held at Department of Justice internment camps for enemy aliens were threatened and beaten; some were shot and killed.32
In short, while there was no physical brutality that even remotely
resembled the treatment of European Jews and others in Nazi Germany's death camps, the Relocation Centers certainly did see their
share of physical brutality of a less systematic sort.
Chief Justice Rehnquist downplays the scope of rights deprivation in other parts of the book as well. For example, in contrasting
World War II to earlier wars, he asserts that "[diuring World War II,
there was no overt effort by the government to suppress public criticism of government war policy" (p 221). This assertion would surely
come as a surprise to James Omura, the editor of the Denver newspaper Rocky Shimpo, who was arrested and tried for conspiring to
counsel others to evade the draft after publishing editorials critical
of the federal government's January 1944 decision to open the military draft to the Nisei internees.3 Rehnquist's denial also misses the
experiences of the America First Committee, who found themselves
under grand jury investigation for opposing American involvement
in the war before Pearl Harbor; of David Dellinger and his antiwar
organization People's Peace Now, who were harassed and investigated for opposing the war; of the black press, which found itself
threatened by J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General Francis Biddle
for publishing articles critical of the war effort; of William Dudley
Pelley, leader of the Silver Shirts, who was tried and convicted in
1942 for making anti-government and pro-Nazi statements in the
Silver Shirt newspaper;' and of the thirty defendants charged in
United States v McWilliams with conspiring to undermine the loyalty and morale of the U.S. armed forces by publishing antiRoosevelt, antiwar, and pro-Nazi publications.3 5
Even more surprisingly (because the story can be found right in
the pages of the U.S. Reports), Rehnquist's denial of government
suppression of antiwar rhetoric during World War II ignores the experience of Elmer Hartzel, convicted under the 1917 Espionage Act
,See Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy 91 (Morrow 1976).
"See Tetsuden Kashima, AmericanMistreatment ofInternees during World War H. Enemy
Alien Japanese,in Daniels, Taylor and Kitano, eds, JapaneseAmericans52, 53 (cited in note
4).
"See Okamoto v United States, 152 F2d 905, 906 (10th Cir 1945). His sole contribution
to the alleged conspiracy was the opinions he voiced in his column. A federal jury acquitted
him, but his newspaper career was over. For more information on these events, see the fascinating oral history of James Omura in Arthur Hansen, ed, JapaneseAmerican World WarII
Evacuation OralHistory Project,PartIV-Resisters 131-335 (K G Saur 1995).
See United States v Pelley, 132 F2d 170 (7th Cir 1942).
These matters are all described in Margaret A. Blanchard's excellent Revolutionary
Sparks 189-229 (Oxford 1992).
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for anonymously mailing to military leaders his writings "depict[ing]
the war as a gross betrayal of America, denounc[ing] our English
allies and the Jews and assail[ing] in reckless terms the integrity
and patriotism of the President of the United States."' Even though
the Court said that it was aware "of the fact that the United States
is now engaged in a total war for national survival and that total
war of the modern variety cannot be won by a doubtful, disunited
nation in which any appreciable sector is disloyal,"37 the Court nonetheless reversed Hartzel's conviction for insufficient evidence.
Hartzels story would have made an excellent addition to All the
Laws but One, both because it demonstrates the official suppression
of dissent during World War II that Rehnquist claims was almost
entirely absent, and because it shows a court (indeed, his Court)
doing what he believes courts rightly shy away from doing-namely,
taking an expansive view of individual liberty during wartime. Yet
Hartzel's story, like the stories of so many of those targeted for exercising their freedoms during wartime, is absent from the book.
While the Chief Justice slights the stories of rights deprivation
during World War II, he often reports the government's claims for
order with an indulgence that strains credulity. He reports that a
commission appointed by Roosevelt and headed by Justice Owen
Roberts concluded that the attack on Pearl Harbor was facilitated
by "Japanese spies on the Island of Oahu,"' some affiliated with the
Japanese consul and some not (p 189). He mentions that as many as
ten thousand Nisei had been sent to Japan for some or all of their
education, that many of the other Nisei attended after-school Japanese cultural and language programs in this country, and that all
Nisei were Japanese citizens under Japanese law (p 207). He also
notes that at the time of the decision to evacuate, the Japanese military had been enjoying great success in the Pacific (pp 195-96) and
had even managed to shell an oil installation near Santa Barbara,
California (p 197)."9 Finally, he observes that the west coast of the
United States had a high concentration of sensitive military and
military supply installations (p 197). For Rehnquist, these facts justified the wholesale evacuation and internment of the Issei, and
would have justified narrower prohibitions against the Nisei." And
Hartzel v United States, 322 US 680, 683 (1944).
Id at 689.
Attack upon Pearl Harbor by Japanese Armed Forces, S Doc No 159, 77th Cong, 2d Sess
12 (1942).
"Several additional shellings of the west coast would occur after the decision to evacuate
had been made (p 197). But those, of course, could not have supported the evacuation, because
they had not yet occurred.
' While he disapproves of the wholesale evacuation and internment of the Nisei, he believes that the Supreme Court lacked the doctrinal tool it needed to strike down their treat-
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he rejects the notion that the military, in lobbying for and ordering
the evacuation and internment, was motivated by ethnic prejudice
or was giving voice to nativist economic jealousies, noting that the
military decisionmakers, "after all, did not at first propose relocation" (p 206).
In justifying much of the internment, the Chief Justice fails to
note that there was not a single documented incident of subversion
by any Issei or Nisei on the United States mainland. Even General
DeWitt was aware of this awkward fact when, on February 14, 1942,
he formally recommended to Secretary of War Henry Stimson that
all west coast Nikkei be evacuated. He wrote that "the Japanese
race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation
Japanese born on American soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted."4'
From this, DeWitt argued,
It ... follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today.
There are indications that these are organized and ready for
concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that
no sabotagehas takenplace to date is a disturbing
and confirm42
taken.
be
will
action
such
that
indication
ing
Could DeWitt have made any plainer his reliance on the old stereotype of the sneaky, inscrutable Oriental? The Japanese and Japanese-Americans simply could not win: their loyalty became the proof
of their disloyalty. DeWitt was just not interested in the argument
that all, most, or even some of the Nikkei posed no security risk; to
him (and in his words), "a Jap [was] a Jap.
It is true, as Chief Justice Rehnquist reports, that the Roberts
Commission Report suggested that some Nikkei may have engaged
in subversive activity in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor. But Hawaii's
residents of Japanese descent were never evacuated or interned.' 4
Rather, the west coast Nikkei, who had done nothing to call their
ment as unconstitutional-namely, the equal protection component to the Fifth Amendments
Due Process Clause that was still ten years from discovery (pp 207-08). See text accompanying
note 25. This defense of the Court is unpersuasive. If the Court could discover an equal protection component to the Due Process Clause in a 1954 case involving black schoolchildren,
Boiling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954), it could surely have discovered the same right in a 1944
case involving Japanese prisoners in internment camps.
1 J.L. DeWitt, FinalReport: JapaneseEvacuationfrom the West Coast, 1942 34, quoted
in Commission on Wartime Relocation, PersonalJustice Denied at 82 (cited in note 17).
42 Id (emphasis added).
See Commission on Wartime Relocation, PersonalJusticeDenied at 66 (cited in note 17).
" See Joel B. Grossman, The JapaneseAmerican Cases and the Vagariesof Constitutional
Adjudication in Wartime:An InstitutionalPerspective, 19 U Hawaii L Rev 649, 653 (1997)
(stating that less than one percent of those of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii were interned).
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loyalty into question, were. This discrepancy leads to another of the
discriminations of the internment: west coast Japanese were interned on suspicion of disloyalty while east coast German and Italian aliens were not. Rehnquist, however, has little sympathy for the
claim that the west coast Issei were treated differently from east
coast German and Italian aliens (pp 210-11). The Issei, he reasons,
were tightly concentrated along the coast where Japanese military
activity was feared, whereas east coast Germans and Italians were
a bit more dispersed along a coast where the feared danger was the
sinking of ships rather than bombings or troop invasions. Yet as
Rehnquist himself notes, it was on the east coast, not the west,
where two groups of Nazi soldiers actually sneaked onto the territory of the mainland United States with the goal of attempting sabotage, and did so with the assistance of American citizens of German
descent (pp 136-37)."5
With the decisive American victory in the Battle of Midway in
June of 1942, any fear of a Japanese attack or invasion of the west
coast of the United States became, in Rehnquist's words, "all but
groundless" (p 211). Whatever slim excuse of military necessity had
justified the evacuation of the Nikkei to assembly centers late in
March of 1942 evaporated a little more than two months after the
evacuation began. 46 That fact, too, is of little consequence to the
Chief Justice, because "the relocation program was established and
put into effect before that decisive encounter" (p 211).
This is not so. When the Battle of Midway ended on June 6,
1942, none of the sixteen assembly centers to which the Nikkei were
initially evacuated had been open for more than six weeks, and the
evacuation of the Nikkei from their homes to these temporary assembly centers was just concluding.47 In other words, at that decisive
, See Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times: 1918-1969 227 (Harper & Row
1972).
It is not just hindsight that allows us to see Midway as a turning point in the Pacific
theater. That is how the battle was understood at the time. On Monday, June 15, The New
Republic reported "a great victory": "If[the Japanese] had been successful, the Hawaiian islands and the continent of the United States would have been next on the list. The American
victory probably means that the Japanese will be put on the defensive in this whole area for
months to come and perhaps permanently, since our naval building program far outstrips their
own." A Great Victory, New Republic 811 (June 15, 1942). See also Donald W. Mitchell, The
Score After Midway, The Nation 732, 733 (June 27, 1942) ("[It is safe to say that Japan will
find it difficult to undertake large-scale sea offensives for months, possibly years, to come.");
War 1, Phase I, Time 15 (June 22, 1942); William V. Pratt, The Way Is Open for a U.S. Pacific
Punch, Newsweek 26 (June 22, 1942). The devastating impact of Midway on the Japanese was
noted even in the west coast press. See Ven Haugland, Victory Eases Threat to U.S., LA Times
2 (June 8, 1942); The Midway Battle, San Fran Chron 12 (June 9, 1942).
' See Commission on Wartime Relocation, PersonalJusticeDenied at 138 (cited in note
17); Record Alien EvacuationEnds on Schedule: 99,770 JapsRemoved from Coast War Zones,
LA Times 9 (June 8, 1942) (reporting that the evacuation of the Nikkei from their homes to
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moment, a few of the 110,000 who would ultimately be interned
were still in their homes, and the rest were in assembly centers not
far from their homes. As the Battle of Midway raged, only a trickle
of evacuees was moving from the assembly centers to the relocation
centers in the interior, because most of the interior camps had not
yet been built. The overwhelming majority of evacuees did not board
trains for the interior until at least six to twelve weeks afterthe Battle of Midway was won. So while the evacuation had been largely
(albeit not entirely) completed by Midway, the internment-which
would last three long years-had really not even begun.
Of course, the Supreme Court that upheld the constitutionality
of the internment in November of 1944 knew all of this. But, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist says, the war was still on. Perhaps it was
only natural that the wartime Court would be reluctant to secondguess the government's claims while the battle raged. It is disturbingly unnatural, though, to see the Chief Justice crediting those
claims fifty-three years later.
B. A Book that Ends Too Soon
All the Laws but One is not the Chief Justice's first book. He has
published two others, one a history of the impeachments of Justice
Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson," and the other a history of the Supreme Court. 49 The Supreme Court history was entitled The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is, but that title is
misleading, because Rehnquist's history of the Supreme Court stops
in the early 1950s. All the Laws but One stops a few years before
that, in the mid-1940s. It does not address any post-World War II
military episode, including an episode that we refer to, colloquially
at least, as a war: Vietnam.
Rehnquist has lawyerly reasons for confining his history to the
nation's two most recent declared wars and its one insurrection.
"Without question," he argues, "the government's authority to engage in conduct that infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared war-the Schenck and Hirabayashiopinions make this clear"
(p 218). He refers to a passage from Schenck v United States" in
which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that "[w]hen a nation is
at war many things which might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so
assembly centers ended "on schedule" on June 7, 1942-the day after the Battle of Midway
ended).
" William H. Rehnquist, GrandInquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel
Chase and PresidentAndrew Johnson (Morrow 1992).
William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court:How It Was, How It Is (Morrow 1987).
50 249 US 47 (1919).
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long as men fight,"5 1 and to a passage from Hirabayashiin which
Chief Justice Stone said that otherwise impermissible ethnic or racial distinctions may be permissible during wartime.52 As for the
Civil War, Rehnquist admits that it was not a declared war, but
points out that in The Prize Cases,5" the Supreme Court held that an
insurrection was the equivalent of a declared war (p 218). Thus, the
Chief Justice fixes the boundaries of his inquiry the way a lawyer
would, by citation to authority. 4
Regrettably, the inquiry in which the Chief Justice actually engages, and the conclusions he draws, do not sit comfortably within
those boundaries. In his final chapter, titled InterArma Silent Leges,
Rehnquist generalizes his observations of executive and judicial behavior during the Civil War and the World Wars to make a normative claim about the proper scope of individual freedoms during wartime. That claim is bottomed on Learned Hand's observation (made
during, but not directly about, World War II) that "[a] society in
which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a
society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few."55 From
this, Rehnquist reasons that wartime shifts the balance of freedom
and order "in favor of the government's ability to deal with conditions that threaten the national well-being" (p 222).
But other situations can "threaten the national well-being" at
least as much as declared wars and insurrection. Consider the undeclared war in Vietnam. American involvement in that war was a
primary catalyst (along with the civil rights movement) of what was
probably the greatest period of domestic turmoil since the Civil War.
Antiwar and antidraft movements formed that were at least as vocal
as any such movement during World War I. Political demonstrations
against the war and racial prejudice were ubiquitous, riots not uncommon. Cities burned.

'Id at 52.
See Hirabayashi,320 US at 100.
67 US (2 Black) 635, 666-67 (1863) (holding that while civil wars are not formally declared, Confederate declaration of independence, organization of armies, and commencement
of hostilities created a state of war nonetheless).
' The lawyering here may not even be especially skilled. While Justice Holmes and Chief
Justice Stone wrote during declared wars, nothing in the Schenck or Hirabayashiopinions
suggests that the reasoning was confined to declared wars. These opinions therefore may not
support the considerable weight that Rehnquist places on them. Moreover, the text of the Constitution itself appears inconsistent with the line Rehnquist draws, a line that places declared
war and rebellion to one side and all other military conflict to the other. Where the Constitution overtly foresees rights restriction through the suspension of habeas corpus, it does so "in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion," not in cases of rebellion or declared war. US Const, Art I, § 9,
cl 2.
.Hand, The Spirit of Liberty at 190 (cited in note 28).
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The Supreme Court's performance during this period of national
crisis neither confirms nor denies Rehnquist's view. On the one
hand, the Court upheld the conviction of David Paul O'Brien for
burning his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse,
rejecting his First Amendment claim. 6 The Court had little interest
in O'Brien's entirely plausible assertion that the statute forbidding
destruction of draft cards was directed at suppressing antidraft and
antiwar speech; it was enough for the Court that the statute served
the government's important interest in a well-functioning selective
service system." On the other hand, the Court rejected the government's efforts to halt publication in the New York Times and the
WashingtonPost of a stolen, top-secret military report that detailed
the history of the (still ongoing) American military involvement in
Vietnam.' Here the Court brushed aside the government's assertions that publication of the Pentagon Papers would compromise
ongoing military operations and peace negotiations, and very likely
endanger the lives of American soldiers in battle or captivity. Justice
Harlan, in dissent, insisted (consistently, it seems, with Chief Justice Rehnquist's views) that the scope of judicial authority to override the executive's national security judgments was "exceedingly
narrow."59 Yet a majority of the Court concluded that the First
Amendment rights of the newspapers and their readers trumped the
government's military concerns.
This point about Vietnam suggests an even broader shortcoming in All the Laws but One. If, as the Chief Justice argues, the scope
of "civil liberties" is fluid, determined by the force of the call for "allegiance to... organized government" at a given moment (p 222),
then a complete account should examine the state of civil liberties
at all moments of grave national crisis. The Great Depression, for
example, surely posed at least as great a threat to the national wellbeing as did World War I. It was also a time when the balance between individual freedoms-economic freedoms-and government
power shifted dramatically, and probably permanently, in favor of
the government's ability to deal with the conditions that threatened
the national well-being. Seen in this light, the New Deal's dramatic
redefinition of federal-state power and the Supreme Court's repudiation of Lochner v New York6" in the late 1930s are at least as relevant to Rehnquist's theme as the Court's First Amendment decisions

See United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 376-77 (1968).

Id at 377-81.
See New York Times Co v United States, 403 US 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon Papers"
case).
Id at 758 (Harlan dissenting).
® 198 US 45 (1905).
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of World War I. They also tend to confirm his thesis that at a time
of national crisis, the executive and legislative branches tend to
overrun even the freedoms they take to be fundamental in the name
of overcoming
the crisis, and the courts tend to let them have their
61
way.
To write a book about the health of civil liberties in all times of
national crisis would be an enormous undertaking.62 Chief Justice
Rehnquist does have a day job, and it would be unreasonable to expect him to take on such a task. It would not have been unreasonable, however, for the Chief Justice to extend his book to all periods
of significant national military crisis, including Vietnam. One can
only speculate about his reasons for not doing so. Perhaps the
Rehnquist Court is still too often called upon to come to grips (or to
blows) with the work of the late Warren Court that the Chief Justice
does not feel comfortable speaking his mind about it in his extrajudicial capacity as a historian. On the other hand, it may be that the
legacy of the Warren Court in times of national crisis so undermines
(or at least complicates) the normative claims of his book that he
thought it easier to make his point without Vietnam than with it.
The former explanation would be an excusable, if perhaps somewhat
exaggerated, bow to propriety. The latter explanation would simply
be inexcusable. Either way, his omission of the executive, legislative,
and judicial response to the war in Vietnam significantly weakens
All the Laws but One.
III..
Vietnam, however, was not the only American military conflict
that produced a mix of executive and judicial responses to civil liberties claims. So too did the Civil War, World War I, and World War
II, the rebellion and the declared wars that are Chief Justice
Rehnquist's avowed focus. That, of course, is not the impression one
gets from All the Laws but One: Rehnquist makes the case that these
three military conflicts, at least while they were ongoing, were virtually unalloyed disasters for those seeking protection of their civil
liberties.
The Chief Justice is unquestionably right that "in time of war
the government's authority to restrict civil liberty is greater than in
peacetime" (p 224). He is probably also correct that future presi" The analogy to the Court's rejection of Lochner is admittedly an imperfect one; it took
many years of crisis and some rather aggressive anti-Court advocacy by President Roosevelt
to bring about the Court's full cooperation.
"Such books do exist, at least for segments of American history. See, for example, Paul
L. Murphy's excellent The Constitutionin CrisisTimes (cited in note 45), which covers the
period from 1918 to 1969.
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dents' and judges' behavior in wartime will more or less follow their
predecessors'. But, importantly, the record of how past presidents
and judges actually behaved is a good deal less monolithic than the
Chief Justice claims. Just as there are many somber stories of rights
deprivation and judicial timidity during wartime, there are also
(admittedly fewer) stories of rights protection and judicial courage
during wartime. Future wartime presidents, generals, and judges
will read this Chief Justice's book. If, as the Chief Justice hopes in
the book's final page, we are moving toward an era of greater rights
protection during wartime (p 225), future readers should be familiar
not just with the stories of repression, but also with the stories of
liberation.
Some of those stories are in the Chief Justice's book, but they
are not emphasized. For example, within days of Abraham Lincoln's
decision to suspend the writ of habeas corpus along the train line
north of Baltimore, Maryland's governor (who had ordered the
burning of the railroad bridges) convened the Maryland legislature
to consider secession from the Union (pp 23-24). Maryland's secession would have left the Union capital completely surrounded by
hostile territory. Lincoln considered arresting the legislators to prevent them from meeting, but decided against it. He explained to his
commanding general that even though the Maryland legislators
would "not improbably ... take action to arm the people of that
State against the United States," they should not be arrested or dispersed because, among other things, "[t]hey have clearly legal right
to assemble, and we can not know in advance that their action will
not be lawful and peaceful" 3 (p 24). In other words, a few days after
suspending the writ of habeas corpus in part of Maryland, Lincoln
acted to protect the constitutional assembly rights of potentially secessionist Maryland legislators.
This story appears in a chapter entitled "Lincoln Suspends Habeas Corpus"--a title that makes plain what the Chief Justice believes to have been the noteworthy development for civil liberties at
that point in the Civil War. Rehnquist is undoubtedly right to make
the suspension of habeas corpus the headline. What, though, is the
reader to make of the counterexample? The Chief Justice does not
say, but the answer is important. Later the Chief Justice writes that
"[there is no reason to think that future wartime presidents will act

' It is unclear whether Lincoln was referring to the assembly rights of state legislators
under the First Amendment or under a state constitutional analogue of the right of federal
legislators to attend legislative sessions without fear of arrest. See US Const, Art I, § 6, cl 1
("The Senators and Representatives ...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach
of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.").
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differently from Lincoln" (p 224). Which Lincoln does he mean? The
one who suspended the writ of habeas corpus, or the one who chose
to protect the assembly rights of a hostile state legislature?
Similarly, Rehnquist briefly mentions a fascinating story involving a young general Andrew Jackson governing New Orleans by
martial law after defeating the British during the War of 18124 (pp
69-70). While awaiting official word on the outcome of peace negotiations in Europe, Jackson kept the city under tight military rule. An
editorial by Louis Louailler appeared in the French-language press
expressing impatience with Jackson's continued imposition of martial law. Jackson responded by having Louailler arrested and tried
by a military tribunal. Rehnquist reports that the military court acquitted Louailler, "quite surprisingly on the basis that he was not in
the armed forces and therefore could not be tried before such a body"
(p 70). This is indeed surprising; in every other military trial of civilians during wartime that Rehnquist mentions in All the Laws but
One, the civilians are convicted. It would have been fascinating had
the Chief Justice pursued this stunning counterexample.
The same can be said of the book's treatment of World War I.
Admittedly, the civil liberties record of that time was abysmal-so
bad that one historian of the period labels the wartime Wilson administration "the surveillance state."65 Amidst the horrors,66 though,
were figures and moments of enlightenment. When Wilson asked
Congress for a provision that would have subjected a person to up to
ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for publishing anything
that the President might declare to be possibly useful to the enemy,
Congress refused him (pp 173-74). When an assistant attorney general proposed a bill authorizing military trials and the death penalty
for civilians who interfered with the war effort, the President publicly opposed it, and the lawyer resigned (p 183). The 50 percent conviction rate6 7 for defendants charged under the Espionage Act between June 30, 1917, and June 30, 1921-a number the Chief Justice reports (p 183)-was well below the overall conviction rate in
the federal courts at the time6 8 -a fact the Chief Justice omits.
'4Actually, unbeknownst to Jackson, his victory at New Orleans came after the War of
1812. A peace treaty ending the war was signed about two weeks before his victory over the
British at New Orleans, but word of the treaty had not yet reached New Orleans.
"Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Originof Civil Liberties in the United States 71
(Norton 1979).
"Id at 128-32 (listing a horrifying array of wartime rights deprivations).
"See Harry N. Scheiber, The Wilson Administrationand Civil Liberties: 1917-1921 63
(Cornell 1960).
"In 1917, the general conviction rate in federal court was 70 percent. Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney Generalof the United States for the Year 1917 125 (GPO
1917). In 1918, the rate was 75 percent. Department of Justice, AnnualReport of the Attorney
General of the UnitedStates for the Year 1918 156 (GPO 1918). The 1919 rate was 72 percent.
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These are counterexamples to Rehnquist's thesis that actually
made it into All the Laws but One. There are, however, two very important tales that did not make it into the book at all. One is a story
of Lincoln and civil liberties in the Civil War, the other a story of a
judge and civil liberties during the Japanese-American internment.
Both deserve far more attention than they now receive in the Civil
War and World War II literature.
A. President Lincoln Protects the Jews of the Tennessee
The first half of the nineteenth century saw a remarkable wave
of German immigration into the United States. Fleeing economic
chaos in Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, German immigrants fanned out across the American landscape, settling not just
in the major east coast cities but also in inland trade centers. Among
these German immigrants were Jews, primarily (although not exclusively) merchants. By 1860, about sixteen thousand Jewish country peddlers were at work in the United States, supported by a network of primarily Jewish retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers
that stretched all the way back to the east coast.69 Many of these
Jews settled along the major inland trade routes of the time-the
Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi Rivers. Some struggled, many (like
the Brandeis family of Louisville, Kentucky) moderately prospered,
and a few became business and civic leaders. Some quickly assimilated; others did not.
With the outbreak of the Civil War, the western trade routes,
especially the Mississippi, became crucial to both North and South.
At first, both North and South left the Mississippi open to trade. 70
For the South, the river brought much needed coin and supplies
southward to support the war effort. The North, for its part, needed
southern cotton and was reluctant to wreak havoc on the economies
of the western border states by shutting down trade with the South.
By the summer of 1861, however, both South and North took steps
to stem trade along the Mississippi. President Lincoln took the
bolder step, announcing in August that all trade with the Confeder-

Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney Generalof the United States for the Year
1919 120 (GPO 1919). In 1920, the rate dropped to 69 percent, where it remained for the year
1921 as well. Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney Generalof the United States
for the Year 1920 201 (GPO 1920); Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Year 1921 151 (GPO 1921).
Howard M. Sachar, A History of the Jews in America 42-43 (Knopf 1992).
70 See Joseph H. Parks, A Confederate Trade Center underFederalOccupation:Memphis,
1862 to 1865, 7 J S Hist 289, 289-90 (1941).
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acy was prohibited. Individuals wishing to trade could do so only by
applying for a permit from the Department of the Treasury.7 '
Memphis, Tennessee, was probably the greatest southern commerce center along the Mississippi north of New Orleans. It remained in rebel hands until the Confederate defeat at the Battle of
Shiloh in April 1862 forced the Confederacy to abandon western
Tennessee to General Ulysses S. Grant's advancing Union forces.72
Two months later, Memphis was under federal occupation.
Under Lincoln's order of August 1861, Union traders (and those
who would take a loyalty oath to the Union) were free to operate in
any federally occupied locale. With the occupation of Memphis, this
southern trade center saw a wave of northern merchants, including
but not limited to Jews, sweep into town. The situation in Memphis
immediately became quite complex. On the one hand, the Lincoln
administration wished to entice the local population back into the
Union fold by ending their deprivation and allowing them to regain
at least a fraction of their lost prosperity. The Union also desperately needed cotton for its own military and economic uses. On the
other hand, the markets of Memphis were close to enemy lines;
goods bartered for cotton quickly made their way to the Confederate
army to support soldiers in the field. Because of these conflicting
demands and incentives, the trade policies of the occupying Union
forces shifted frequently from prohibition to encouragement and
everything in between.73 In such a confused setting, bribery and corruption-even in the ranks of the Union army-soon became rampant.
Union military leaders, charged with the responsibility for administering the military Department of the Tennessee (which included that state and parts of Mississippi and Kentucky), quickly
began expressing their frustration with the trade, licit and illicit,
that they felt undermined the Union war effort. Grant complained
in a letter to his sister that "[w]ith all my other trials I have to condend [sic] against is added that of speculators whos [sic] patriotism
is measured by dollars & cents. Country has no value with them
compared with money."74 Most of the ire, however, focused on the
Jews, even though they represented only a fraction of the offending
traders. Grant wrote to the Assistant Secretary of War that "in spite
of all the vigilance that can be infused into Post Commanders,]
7'See id at 290.
See id at 291.

See Bertram Wallace Korn, American Jewry and the Civil War 121-22 (Jewish Publication Society 1951).
' Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to Mary Grant (Dec 15, 1862), in John Y. Simon, ed, 7 The
Papersof Ulysses S. Grant43, 44 (Southern Illinois 1979) ("GrantPapers").
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. . . the Specie regulations of the Treasury Dept. have been violated,
and that mostly by Jews and other unprincipled traders.... [The
Jews] come in with their Carpet sacks in spite of all that can be done
to prevent it. The Jews seem to be a privileged class that can travel
anywhere.""
When Grant decided to take action, he set aside his concerns
with the "other unprincipled traders" and took aim solely at the
Jews. On December 17, 1862, he issued his General Order Number
11:
I. The Jews, as a class, violating every regulation of trade established by the Treasury Department, and also Department
orders, are hereby expelled from the Department.
II. Within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this order by
Post Commanders, they will see that all of this class of people
are furnished with passes and required to leave, and any one
returning after such notification, will be arrested and held in
confinement until an opportunity occurs of sending them out as
prisoners unless furnished with permits from these Head Quarters.
III. No permits will be given these people to visit Head Quarters for the purpose of making personal application for trade
permits. 6
Thus, all Jews in the Department of the Tennessee had twenty-four
hours to clear out or be arrested. Grant's order applied indiscriminately to all Jews-men, women, and children; traders and nontraders; recent arrivals and established members of the community. On
its face, it applied even to Jewish soldiers in the Union army. Such
a military order would not be seen again until General DeWitt
evicted the Nikkei from the west coast eighty years later.
Like the west coast Japanese-Americans, the Jews of the Tennessee complied with the military order. Twenty-five hundred Jews
desperately began looking for scarce transport up the Mississippi
river and out of the reach of Grant's order.7 7 Their departure was
rushed and traumatic. One surviving account tells of"a baby almost
left behind in the haste and confusion and tossed bodily into the
boat" and of "two dying women permitted to remain behind in
' Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to Christopher P. Wolcott (Dec 17, 1862), in Simon, ed,
GrantPapers56, 56 (cited in note 74).
" See GeneralOrdersNo. 11 (Dec 17, 1862), in Simon, ed, GrantPapers50 (cited in note
74). The order was signed by Grant's assistant, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Rawlins, "[b]y
Order of Maj. Gen]. U.S. Grant." Id. It is settled, however, that the order was Granes. Id at 51.
7 Sachar, History of the Jews at 79 (cited in note
69).
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neighbors' care."78 Another account tells of a group of four Jews in
Oxford, Mississippi, whose horse, buggy, and luggage were confiscated shortly before they were sent away by train under guard.7 9
When one of them asked the reason for their detention, he was told,
"Because you are Jews, and are neither a benefit to the Union or
Confederacy.""
Jewish community leaders complained about the order and
sought to have it rescinded. A delegation of Jews from Paducah,
Kentucky sent a telegram to President Lincoln protesting Grant's
"inhuman order, the carrying out of which would be the grossest
violation of the Constitution and our rights as citizens under it,
[and] which will place us... as outlaws before the whole world."8 1
The leader of this delegation, Cesar J. Kaskel, also sent letters and
telegrams to Jewish community leaders and newspapers around the
country, urging them to speak out against Grant's order.
Kaskel then traveled to Washington, D.C., where he, an Ohio
congressman, and the leader of a national Jewish organization were
granted an appointment with President Lincoln. Kaskel showed the
president Grant's order and explained its background and impact.
Lincoln, shocked by the order, responded with a biblical metaphor:
Lincoln: And so the children of Israel were driven from the
happy land of Canaan?
Kaskel: Yes, and that is why we have come unto Father Abraham's bosom, asking protection.
Lincoln: And this protection they shall have at once.8
At that, Lincoln drafted a note to his General-in-Chief of the Army,
Henry W. Halleck, instructing him to rescind General Order Number 11.
Halleck later took the opportunity to explain to General Grant
why President Lincoln had revoked the order:
It may be proper to give you some explanation of the revocation
of your order expelling all Jews from your Dept. The President
has no objection to your expelling traders & Jew pedlars [sic],
which I suppose was the object of your order, but as it in terms

Korn, American Jewry at 123 (cited in note 73), quoting an interview with Mrs. William
Fineshriber of Philadelphia.
" Korn, American Jewry at 123 (cited in note 73).
'0 Id.
I Id at 124.
Id at 125.
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prescribed an entire religious class, some of whom are fighting
83
in our ranks, the President deemed it necessary to revoke it.
Lincoln himself explained to a group of Jewish leaders that he "d[id]
not like to hear a class or nationality condemned on account of a few
sinners." 4
This episode thus marks an early appearance on record of what
now seems commonplace: heightened or "strict" scrutiny of a law
that singles out a racial, ethnic, or religious group for a unique burden. The order was both underinclusive, in that it did not target
non-Jewish traders, and overinclusive, in that it did target nontrading Jews. But heightened scrutiny was not part of legal or constitutional understanding in 1863. Indeed, many decades would pass
before courts would develop the doctrine as they struggled to give
meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.8 5
This important episode in Civil War history does not square
with Chief Justice Rehnquist's account of that war or of Abraham
Lincoln. The picture of Lincoln that emerges from Rehnquist's
lengthy examination of the Civil War is of a chief executive willing
to do whatever it took-constitutional or not-to win the war and
save the Union. Undoubtedly, he was willing to do a great deal to
bring together the "house divided." But he was also willing to protect
the rights of a vilified minority by applying a form of rigorous review
that was well ahead of its time. 6 More importantly, he was willing
to do so even if it meant publicly overruling his most (and arguably
his only) successful general at a time when the Union army's position in the field was far from secure, many months before the tide of
the war would finally turn in the North's favor at Gettysburg. This
is a very different Abraham Lincoln from the one we read about in
All the Laws but One. It is, however, the real Abraham Lincoln-a
complex figure who could simultaneously authorize and forbid the
curtailment of fundamental freedoms.

Simon, ed, GrantPapersat 54 (cited in note 74).
Letterfrom the Editor,The Israelite 218 (Jan 16, 1863).
See UnitedStates v CaroleneProductsCo, 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938) (noting in dicta
that laws evidencing prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities" may be subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny).
" This is not to say that Lincoln's approach to the problem of Grant's order was entirely
unprecedented. Professor Melissa Saunders has recently (and powerfully) argued that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause understood that clause "to
nationalize a constitutional limitation on state action developed by the state courts in the first
half of the nineteenth century- the doctrine against'partiar or'special' laws, which forbade the

state to single out any person or group of persons for special benefits or burdens without an
adequate 'public purpose' justification." Melissa L. Saunders, EqualProtection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness,96 Mich L Rev 245, 247-48 (1997).
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Surprisingly, the story of the Jews of the Tennessee is not well
known. Had it been well known in 1944, it might have helped the
Supreme Court reach a different outcome on the constitutionality of
the Japanese-American internment in Korematsu. Not only were the
two evacuations strikingly similar, but the Korematsu case actually
presented a far easier case of unconstitutionality than did the
evacuation of the Jews. General Grant based his order on documented involvement of at least some Jews in illegal trade along the
Mississippi; General DeWitt could point to nothing more than the
absence of any subversive activity by the Nikkei to support their deportation. General Grant ordered the evacuation of the Jews months
before the Union Army gained the upper hand at Gettysburg; the
long-term internment of the Nikkei did not even begin until weeks
after the decisive battle at Midway. While Lincoln struck down General Order Number 11 when the survival of the Union was seriously
in doubt, the Supreme Court upheld the Japanese-American internment program against constitutional attack late in 1944, when
the far-flung Japanese empire was collapsing and American forces
were routing the Japanese in battle after battle. Chief Justice
Rehnquist defends the Korematsu Court by noting that it did not
have an equal protection clause to apply to federal action in 1944 (p
208). Yet there was no Equal Protection Clause at all when Abraham Lincoln overturned the evacuation of the Jews of the Tennessee. In short, if Lincoln's decision to strike down the evacuation of
the Jews was right in December of 1862, then it is difficult to see
how the military's decision to evacuate and intern the Nikkei in
1942 could have been right, and it is even more difficult to understand the Supreme Court's decision to uphold that decision late in
1944.
Dissenting in Korematsu,Justice Jackson described the danger
of the Court's opinion upholding the internment:
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that
it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order,
the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need."'

Korematsu, 323 US at 246 (Jackson dissenting).
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This nation may again see a race-based evacuation or internment.
But Korematsu, although fallen from favor,"8 has never been overruled-the weapon is still loaded and lying about. For a future court
seeking to protect civil liberties in wartime, the story of President
Lincoln's protection of the Jews of the Tennessee is a loaded weapon
pointing away from Korematsu and toward freedom. It is regrettable
that this important story was not part of All the Laws but One.
B. Judge Louis Goodman Protects the Nisei Draft Resisters
A common complaint among the interned Nikkei was that they
did not understand why the government had placed them behind
barbed wire. Several hundred Nisei, however, ended up behind
barbed wire of a different sort, and they had no confusion about why
they were there. These young men were draft resisters. The barbed
wire that enclosed them was atop the imposing fences of federal
prisons. Early in 1944, the federal government had ordered them out
of the relocation centers and into the U.S. Army-the same army
that continued to guard their parents and their brothers and sisters.
Unlike many of their fellow internees, however, these young men
said "no."
People are typically quite surprised to learn that the interned
Nisei were drafted. Why, after all, would the government that
evacuated them as military risks nonetheless want them in the
army? At least some of the impetus to draft the Nisei out of the
camps appears to have come (surprisingly) from a segment of the
Japanese-American community itself. In June of 1942, the War Department changed the selective service classification of the NiseiAmerican citizens all-to IV-C, the category for "aliens not
acceptable to the armed forces."89 Almost immediately, a Nisei
organization called the Japanese American Citizens League
("JACL") began lobbying the government to allow Nisei to volunteer
and join the military in order to demonstrate their loyalty." This
idea appealed to Dillon Myer, the director of the civilian War
Relocation Authority that had been created in November of 1942 to

" See Adarand Constructors,Inc v Pena,515 US 200, 236 (1995) (describing Korematsu
as an "error" in which the application of strict scrutiny failed to invalidate "an illegitimate
racial classification").
' 32 CFR § 622.43 (Supp 1943) (defining selective service classification TV-C). The classification of the Nisei as IV-C is reported in Bill Hosokawa, Thirty-Five Years in the FryingPan
52 (McGraw-Hill 1978).
' See Mike Masaoka with Bill Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka:An American
Saga 115, 120-28 (Morrow 1987); Bill Hosokawa, JACL in Quest of Justice 193-212 (Morrow
1982).
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administer the internment camps.9 He too began pressing for the
right of the Nisei to volunteer.92
In January of 1943, the War Department agreed. It did not,
however, wish to accept any Nisei volunteer whose loyalty was questionable. The War Department therefore proposed the distribution
of a loyalty questionnaire to young men in all ten of the relocation
centers. The idea of a questionnaire took hold quickly, and was soon
expanded to all evacuees, Issei and Nisei. (The government hoped
that the questionnaire would make it easier to determine which internees might be permitted to leave the camps for employment or
educational opportunities in the midwest and east.) The four-page
questionnaire, entitled "Application for Leave Clearance," included
two poorly-worded and ill-fated questions, numbers 27 and 28:
27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United
States on combat duty wherever ordered?
28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States
of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or
all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form
of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, to any other
foreign government, power or organization?93
Questions 27 and 28 caused confusion, anxiety, and heartache
for the internees, Nisei and Issei alike. The Nisei were concerned
that a "yes" answer to Question 27 would be tantamount to volunteering to join the armed forces and forsaking their parents and siblings in the camps, and they were incensed that they were being
asked in Question 28 to "forswear" an allegiance to the Japanese
Emperor when they had never sworn such allegiance in the first
place. The Issei, for their part, had not the faintest idea how Question 27 could possibly apply to them, and they were understandably
reluctant to respond affirmatively to Question 28 and renounce the
only citizenship they had (or were permitted to have), thereby rendering themselves stateless. All were concerned that if members of
the same family answered the questions differently, they might be
permanently separated from one another.94 To varying degrees, all
were also tired and bitter from a long year of mistreatment and suffering.

For a provocative and intensely critical biography of Dillon Myer, see Richard Drinnon,
Keeper of ConcentrationCamps:Dillon S. Myer and American Racism (California 1987).
See Smith, Democracy on Trial at 289 (cited in note 30).
See Edward H. Spicer, et al, Impounded People 143 (Arizona 1969).
For a good description of the dilemmas caused by the loyalty questionnaires, see id at
169-86.
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The two questions produced a dizzying variety of responses:
many set aside their confusion and answered "yes" to both questions;
some answered with a mix of "yes" and "no"; others scribbled qualifications to their responses in the margins of the form; still others left
the questions blank. Some, however, answered "no" to both, usually
in protest of the way the government had treated them. Most of
these internees were promptly bundled off to the Tule Lake Relocation Center in northern California, a relocation center converted by
the government to house those of especially dubitable loyalty."
The loyalty questionnaires did serve their original purpose: volunteer Nisei from the relocation centers began serving on the segregated 442d Regimental Combat Team. When stories of their bravery
in battle began making their way back to the United States late in
1943, the JACL decided to press further. Its leaders began lobbying
the War Department to reopen the draft to the Nisei as well and
force into the army the overwhelming majority of Nisei who had not
answered, and who had no intention of answering, the army's call
for volunteers. 6 The government agreed in January of 1944. By midFebruary, induction notices began appearing in the mail at all ten
relocation centers, including Tule Lake.
The opening of the draft to the Nisei was greeted in the camps
with widespread concern and disbelief. Issei parents, who had already lost their homes, their livelihoods, their security, and their
dignity, were now to lose their sons as well. Nisei of draft age worried about leaving their aging parents and younger siblings behind
to fend for themselves in the camps. Residents of all of the camps
complained about the unfairness of the government's decision simultaneously to incarcerate and to draft the very same community of
people. For the internees, the draft brought the unfairness of the
internment into even sharper focus.
Nonetheless, most of the young men who received draft notices
complied with their orders and showed up for their physical exams.
At each camp, however, some draftees decided that they had had
enough and refused to comply. At some of the camps, only a handful
of men decided to resist. At two of the camps, Heart Mountain in
Wyoming and Poston in Arizona, upwards of one hundred men resisted. Only at these two camps was the resistance in any way vocal
or organized; elsewhere the draftees made their decisions furtively

For accounts of the conversion of Tule Lake from an ordinary center to a so-called "segregation" center, see Harold Stanley Jacoby, Tule Lake- From Relocationto Segregation (Bonanza 1996); Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, The Spoilage: Japanese
American Evacuationand Resettlement (California 1969).
See Hosokawa, JACL in Quest of Justice at 221 (cited in note 90).
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and in isolation. 7 In virtually every instance, however, the resister's
position was more or less the same: If I am loyal enough to serve in
the army, what have I been doing in a concentration camp for the
last year and a half?
Not only did the government decline to answer this question but
it punished the resisters brutally for asking it. The resisters were
quickly indicted for failing to comply with the draft, arrested by the
FBI, and taken to jail to await trial. All of these young men suddenly
found themselves charged with felonies and facing the possibility of
additional years of incarceration.
Their cases came to trial in federal courtrooms across the western United States in the summer and fall of 1944. Most of the federal district judges hearing these cases behaved as Chief Justice
Rehnquist would expect them to behave during wartime. They typically ran perfunctory trials, sometimes processing as many as several resisters per day. And when the inevitable convictions were obtained, the judges sentenced the resisters to terms of as many as five
(but more typically two to three) years in federal prison. One judge,
T. Blake Kennedy of the District of Wyoming, could not conceal his
frustration with the Heart Mountain resisters:
Personally this Court feels that the defendants have made a serious mistake in arriving at their conclusions which brought
about these criminal prosecutions. If they are truly loyal
American citizens they should, at least when they have become
recognized as such, embrace the opportunity to discharge the
duties of citizens by offering themselves in the cause of our National defense.9"
Such a pronouncement is not surprising from a judge who referred
to the Nisei resisters as "you Jap boys" in open court.9 Judge Kennedy was merely speaking with the voice of a frightened nation consumed by war, which is, as Chief Justice Rehnquist tells us, what
wartime judges typically do.
But not all judges do. In July of 1944, Judge Louis H. Goodman
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California was assigned the prosecutions of twenty-seven young men
from the Tule Lake Relocation Center who had refused to show up
for their physicals. Goodman was fairly new to the bench, having
been appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in November of 1942."'

For a description of the activities of the draft resistance movement at Heart Mountain,
see Okamoto v United States, 152 F2d 905, 906 (10th Cir 1945).
United States v Fujii,55 F Supp 928, 932 (D Wyo 1944).
John Tateishi, And Justice forAll 171 (Random House 1984) (oral history of Jack Tono).
"'Goodman had come far from his humble origins as the son of the proprietor of a small
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Goodman's first two years on the federal district court bench presented few high profile cases. Perhaps the most difficult matters he
encountered before the Tule Lake draft resisters were twelve denaturalization cases that the government brought against naturalized American citizens of German extraction who were members of
a pro-Nazi organization called the German-American Bund. 0°1 The
government's theory was that the defendants had obtained their
U.S. citizenship fraudulently, by claiming attachment to the American government when in fact they felt none. It is ironic, of course,
that such a case would wind up in the courtroom of one of the few
Jewish judges in the country. But Judge Goodman handled the cases
with great care, filing a lengthy opinion that held for the government in seven of the twelve cases and for the defendants in the other
10 2
five.
In July of 1944, Judge Goodman, following a practice of "riding
circuit" that has since been abandoned, drove up the northern California coast to hear cases for a week in the fishing and logging town
of Eureka. Waiting for him, in the Humboldt County jail, were the
twenty-seven young Japanese-American men from Tule Lake who
had refused to comply with their induction notices. Goodman quickly
appointed two Eureka lawyers, Arthur W. Hill, Jr. and Chester
Monette, to represent them.
The resisters (and their attorneys, Hill and Monette) faced an
uphill battle, because public feeling in that war-weary coastal town
was strongly against the Tule Lake boys. The local newspaper, revealing its confusion about their nationality, referred to them as
"the Japanese,"'0 3 and once called them "American born Japs."' ° The
day after the Tule Lake defendants arrived, an article appeared on
the front page of the paper entitled, "Not Enough Food, Japs Com0 5 It is
plain in Jail Here.""
worth quoting at some length:
"Not enough ricee."
country store in rural Lemoore, California. He distinguished himself as an undergraduate at

the University of California, and did only a bit over a year of law school at Hastings before
passing the California bar examination. It was not an easy time for talented Jewish lawyers
to find good work, but Goodman joined a fledgling San Francisco practice and became a successful and well-known practitioner. See John W. Kelley, Introducingthe Master of U.S. Master Calendar,6 The Brief Case 6 (1956).
"' See United States v Holtz, 54 F Supp 63 (N D Cal 1944).
"After the war was over, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed Judge
Goodman's orders as to two of the seven defendants whose citizenship Goodman had deemed
fraudulently obtained. See Fix v United States, 176 F2d 741 (9th Cir 1949); Bechtel v United
States, 176 F2d 746 (9th Cir 1949).
' 27JapInterneesFace Trial Here on Draft Count, Humboldt Standard 1 (July 14, 1944).
,046 JapaneseAppear in Court Here on Draft Charges,Humboldt Standard 3 (July 17,
1944).
'"Not Enough Food,Japs Complain in Jail Here, Humboldt Standard 1 (July 17, 1944).
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That wasn't exactly the plaint of the Japanese prisoners in the
county jail today; their complaint was "Not enough mealee."
According to the custom of all county jails, only two meals a day
are served to prisoners.... Some kind of meat, such as stews
and often a quarter of beef is served every day, and each meal
has plenty of succulence and nutriment, said Sheriff Arthur A.
Ross. But this doesn't seem to be enough for those who have
been raised on rice in the old country.
1 6
They want "three mealees, so solly, please.""

Adding to the resisters' difficulty, their own court-appointed
lawyer, Arthur Hill, publicly mocked them in the same way. At a
dinner given by the local bar to honor Judge Goodman, Hill, serving
as master of ceremonies, spoke of being appointed to represent "the
Japs," and concluded his speech with, "So solly, please." °7 Of course,
none of the defendants actually spoke with such an accent; they had
all been born and raised in this country, and spoke essentially unaccented American English. But the local community needed to transform them into the enemy.
Attorneys Hill and Monette decided not to wage the uphill battle at all. They advised the defendants to plead guilty as charged,
and a group of twelve of them did so at their arraignment on Tuesday, July 18, 1944.08 Judge Goodman, however, was not happy with
this outcome. He turned to a law school classmate, Blaine McGowan,
and asked him to join the defense. McGowan agreed, and quickly
prepared and filed a motion to quash the indictment as violating
Fifth Amendment due process.0 9 He also filed a motion to withdraw
the guilty pleas that had already been entered."' At that, defense
attorney Chester Monette withdrew from the case, announcing publicly that "his advice to the defendants"--presumably his advice that
they all plead guilty--"had been ignored.""'
The defendants, however, did well by ignoring Monette's advice.
On Saturday morning, July 22, 1944, Judge Goodman held one final

' Id.
07FederalCourtAttaches, Local BarMembers Attend Annual Dinner,Humboldt Standard
3 (July 18, 1944).

"'See 12 JapaneseAdmit Draft Evasion Charges in Federal Court Today; 6 Others Arraigned,Humboldt Standard 1 (July 18, 1944).
" See, for example, Motion to Quash Indictment and Terminate Proceedings, UnitedStates
v PaulKojiro Shiraishi,No 8981 (N D Cal 1944) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
"'See Permissionto Withdraw Pleasof Guilty Asked by 12 Japanese,Humboldt Standard
1 (July 19, 1944).
'Indictments of 27 JapaneseAttacked in Court Here, Humboldt Standard 1 (July 20,
1944).
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hearing to wrap up the Eureka session before returning to San
Francisco. The only remaining cases were those of the twenty-seven
Tule Lake draft resisters. Assistant U.S. Attorney Emmett Seawell,
who had prosecuted the cases, was undoubtedly confident that
morning; he knew that every other federal judge who had heard the
cases of Nisei draft resisters that summer had ruled for the government.
He was in for a surprise, as was everyone else in attendance
that morning. Reading his opinion from the bench, Judge Goodman
bluntly dismissed all charges against the defendants.' He declined
to address the defendants' broad attack on the constitutionality of
the larger internment, noting that "certain dangers vitally imminent
to the security of the West Coast [had] motivated the President...
in promulgating" Executive Order 9066.' The "war powers vested
in the executive," he ventured, "may be sufficient constitutional jus' But, he emphasized, "[n]o
tification" for the internment itself.14
such
dangers.., are the basis
for
the
prosecution
of
defendant
[sic]
for
' 5
refusing to be inducted."
Goodman moved quickly to the heart of his argument. "It does
not follow," he said, "that because the war power may allow the detention of defendant at Tulelake [sic], the guaranties of the Bill of
Rights and other Constitutional provisions are abrogated by the existence of war."" 6 Applying the basic test of due process, Goodman
found it
shocking to the conscience that an American citizen be confined
on the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under duress
and restraint, be compelled to serve in the armed forces, or be
prosecuted for not yielding to such compulsion.... The issue
raised by this motion... must be resolved in the light of the
traditional and historic Anglo-American approach to the timehonored doctrine of "due process." It must not give way to overzealousness in an attempt to reach, via the criminal process,
17
those whom we may regard as undesirable citizens. 1
The government did not appeal Goodman's decision." 8 The defendants were returned to Tule Lake Relocation Center, where they
.. Judge Goodman's bench opinion was later reported in the Federal Supplement. See
United States v Kuwabara,56 F Supp 716 (N D Cal 1944).
"'Idat 718.
..
Id at 719.
5Id.
16Id.
" Id.
"'Had the government appealed, it is likely that Goodman's ruling would have been reversed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit later spoke disapprovingly of Judge Good-
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(rather ironically, in light of their court victory) resumed their lives
behind barbed wire.
Chief Justice Rehnquist sees little reason to expect that future
judges will decide wartime civil liberties cases differently from their
predecessors. That may be so. But the Chief Justice did not have
Judge Louis Goodman in mind when he ventured that prediction.
Neither, apparently, did he have in mind any of the three dissenting
Supreme Court Justices in the Korematsu case-Roberts, Murphy,
or even the Justice for whom Rehnquist himself clerked, Jackson. In
short, the judicial record on civil liberties in wartime is a good deal
more complex than the rather simple case the Chief Justice presents." 9 That record includes the several federal district judges across
the west who so harshly punished the Nisei draft resisters, just as
it includes Justice Black and his colleagues in the Korematsu majority. But it also includes the Korematsu dissenters, and a courageous judge named Louis H. Goodman.
CONCLUSION

In 1987, the Supreme Court heard a case called United States
v Salerno.2 In that case, the reputed head of a Mafia crime family
challenged the constitutionality of a federal preventive detention
statute, which permitted the government to incarcerate a defendant
awaiting trial not because he might flee, but because he might be
dangerous if left to roam the streets. Salerno's claim was that the
idea of preventive detention violated the bedrock presumption of
innocence.
By a six-to-three vote, the Supreme Court upheld preventive detention. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion. He recognized that the case presented an unusually stark choice between
the community's interest in its safety and a defendant's interest in
his freedom. But he rejected Salerno's contention that under the Due
Process Clause, freedom claims invariably trump safety concerns.
Rather, he emphasized that "[w]e have repeatedly held that the

man's Kuwabaraopinion in another Nisei draft resistance case. See Takeguma v United States,
156 F2d 437, 441 (9th Cir 1946) (refusing to distinguish Kuwabara on its facts and noting that
to the extent Kuwabara did not accord with the court's own opinion, it was not good law).
"' One might also say, although Chief Justice Rehnquist does not, that the record includes
a courageous Chief Justice named Roger Taney. In the Merryman case, Chief Justice Taney
did everything in his power to oppose the Lincoln administration's trial of John Merryman by
military tribunal for impeding the Union war effort. Chief Justice Taney is therefore another
judge who does not conform to Rehnquist's descriptive or prescriptive claims. Of course, the
mantle of civil libertarian sits uncomfortably on Taney, the author of the morally outrageous
Dred Scott decision. This discomfort, however, only attests to the complexity of the subject that
Rehfiquist tries to treat.
' 481 US 739 (1987).
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Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest."12 1
In support of this proposition, the Chief Justice noted that "in times
of war or insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the
Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes
to be dangerous."122 Here Rehnquist cited a case involving aliens 23
and a case involving state, rather than federal, power to suppress
violent insurrection. 2 4 He did not cite the best known and most apposite case, Korematsu,perhaps because that is not the sort of case
one can cite with approval. But the principle of Korematsu nonetheless lurks in the shadows of Salerno: however "importan[t] and fundamental" the right to liberty, "this right may, in circumstances
where the government's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society."'25
All the Laws but One reads as a historical brief in support of the
Chief Justice's Salerno opinion, cataloguing the many situations in
which wartime executives preferred order to freedom and in which
judges let them have their way. It is a good brief, as one would expect from a man who has devoted a long career to writing and reading them. But it is poor history. The story of civil liberties during
wartime may ultimately be a sorry one for freedom, but it is a sophisticated sorry story, not the simple one that this book gives us.

"'Id at 748.
'MId.
'"Ludecke v Watkins, 335 US 160 (1948).
"Moyer v Peabody, 212 US 78 (1909).
'=Salerno,481 US at 750-51.
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